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OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging racial profiling in a
traffic stop.  The plaintiff is an African American Pennsylvania State Trooper who was
driving his personal automobile while off duty.  The defendants are two Caucasian York
County Deputy Sheriffs who made the traffic stop, the York County Sheriff, and York
County.  Plaintiff Raphael Christopher appeals the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sheriff William Hose and the County, as well as a jury verdict in
favor of Deputies Frederick Nestlerode and Matthew Kerr.  Additionally, Hose, the
County, Nestlerode, and Kerr (“the York Defendants”) cross-appeal from any and all
orders denying their motions.
We will affirm the final judgment in favor of Hose and the County.  We will affirm
in part and vacate in part the final judgment in favor of Nestlerode and Kerr, and will
remand for a new trial on Christopher’s Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of error in
3the District Court’s jury instruction.  We do not reach the York Defendants’ cross-appeal
and will dismiss it.
I.
A.
On August 5, 2003, Christopher was driving in the right-hand lane of a two-lane,
one-way street in York, Pennsylvania, with a posted speed limit of twenty-five miles per
hour.  Nestlerode was driving a marked car in the left-hand lane and training Kerr in
traffic enforcement.  The road surface was wet from a light rain.  Parked cars were
present, but there were no pedestrians on the street.  Upon spotting Christopher’s
automobile, Nestlerode made an immediate estimate that it was traveling at between fifty
and fifty-five miles per hour.  Accordingly, Nestlerode pulled Christopher over to cite
him for driving at an unsafe speed, a violation of § 3361 of the Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Code.  Kerr agreed with Nestlerode that Christopher was driving at an unsafe
speed, and aided Nestlerode by notifying the Sheriff’s Department and monitoring
Christopher’s automobile while Nestlerode spoke with Christopher.  During the course of
the stop, Nestlerode noticed that the addresses on Christopher’s driver’s license and
automobile registration did not match, a violation of § 1515 of the Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Code, and also cited him for that offense.
At trial, Nestlerode testified he had decades of experience enforcing and training
subordinates in enforcement of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.  He had worked in
law enforcement in Pennsylvania since 1969.  As a police corporal in Springettsbury
4Township, York County in the 1980s, Nestlerode had implemented a departmental
training program in traffic enforcement.  At the time he stopped Christopher, he was the
York County Sheriff’s Department field training officer.  Certified in the use of several
speed timing devices, Nestlerode testified he was aware that a police officer’s testimony
on a vehicle’s speed was inadmissible in Pennsylvania courts without the use of such a
device.  Nestlerode testified he had not had “probable cause” to stop Christopher for
exceeding the posted speed limit (a different violation from driving at an unsafe speed),
because he had not measured Christopher’s speed with a speed timing device.  His
testimony also displayed familiarity with state court decisions on deputy sheriffs’
authority to make traffic stops.
B.
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code contains separate prohibitions on driving in
excess of a posted speed limit (§ 3362) and driving at an unsafe speed regardless of the
posted limit (§ 3361).  Christopher was cited for violating the latter, though the District
Court instructed the jury on both offenses.  The prohibition on unsafe speed is context-
dependent: “No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then
existing . . . .”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3361 (West 2006).  On the other hand, a citation
for exceeding the speed limit must state precisely how fast the motorist was driving.  Id. §
3366.  Furthermore, that rate of speed must have been electronically or mechanically
measured—it may be measured by an officer referring to the calibrated speedometer in a
     1 It also states: “Whenever a police officer . . . has reasonable suspicion that a violation
of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle . . . .”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 6308(b) (West 2006).  This standard was changed from “probable cause” to
“reasonable suspicion” effective February 1, 2004.  See Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887
A.2d 1271, 1275 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2005).
     2 Section 3368 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which lays out the speed measurement
requirements, explicitly applies to § 3362 (exceeding the speed limit).  But in Whitmyer
the court interpreted those requirements as also applying to § 3361 (unsafe speed), even
though the text of the statute does not state so.  668 A.2d at 1117–18, 1115 n.5.  Several
Pennsylvania Superior Court cases state that a speed timing device is required for
(continued...)
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police car, but only if the motorist’s vehicle is observed for at least 3/10 of a mile.  Id. §
3368.  It is undisputed that Nestlerode’s marked car did not have a calibrated
speedometer, and that Nestlerode and Kerr observed the speed of Christopher’s
automobile for less than 3/10 of a mile.
While the Motor Vehicle Code details prohibited conduct by motorists,1 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has weighed in on when a law enforcement officer may
have reason to believe the Motor Vehicle Code is being violated.  In Commonwealth v.
Whitmyer, the court found that, in order for an officer to have “probable cause” under the
Fourth Amendment to stop a motorist for violating § 3361 (unsafe speed), the officer
must observe either (1) a vehicle’s speed with a speed timing device (for 3/10 of a mile if
the device is a calibrated speedometer) or (2) special hazards.  668 A.2d 1113, 1117–18
(Pa. 1995).  Whitmyer also appears to require use of a speed timing device in order for an
officer to have Fourth Amendment “probable cause” to stop a motorist for violating §
3362 (exceeding the speed limit).2  In fact, Nestlerode testified that a speed timing device
     2(...continued)
conviction under § 3362.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 633 A.2d 1199, 1201–03
(Pa. Super. 1993).  Moreover, in Shamnoski v. PG Energy, Division of Southern Union
Co., 858 A.2d 589, 601 (Pa. 2004), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that, whereas
§ 3361 sets forth a “traditional reasonable man standard,” § 3362 “speaks in absolutes;
there is no room for the flexibility of the reasonable man standard.”
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was required for “probable cause” to stop a motorist for violating § 3362, and that he had
not had “probable cause” to stop Christopher for that offense because he had used no such
device.
C.
Christopher challenged both citations.  A District Justice found him not guilty of
driving at an unsafe speed but guilty of failing timely to notify PennDOT of his new
address.  Christopher appealed this conviction, contending Nestlerode and Kerr lacked
“probable cause” for the underlying traffic stop, so that his license and registration were
inadmissible.  Ruling on both suppression and the merits, the York County Court of
Common Pleas found there was “probable cause” for the stop and affirmed Christopher’s
conviction for failing to report his address change.  Christopher appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which reversed, relying on Whitmyer to find there was no
“probable cause” for the stop.  The Superior Court considered both sources of “probable
cause” under Whitmyer to believe a violation of § 3361 has occurred—a valid
measurement of speed or special hazards.  It found Nestlerode’s speed estimate was
statutorily invalid because it was not obtained with a speed timing device.  Furthermore,
because Nestlerode had testified visibility was not impaired and that he had observed no
7pedestrians or other moving vehicles in the vicinity, the Superior Court found special
hazards could not have formed the basis for “probable cause.”  The court concluded there
was insufficient evidence Nestlerode formed an objectively reasonable belief that
Christopher was violating § 3361, and held that because Christopher’s license and
registration had been obtained pursuant to a traffic stop for which there was no “probable
cause,” they should have been suppressed.
II.
Christopher sued the York Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging four
counts: (1) by stopping Christopher’s automobile without “probable cause,” Nestlerode
and Kerr committed an unreasonable seizure in violation of Christopher’s Fourth
Amendment rights; (2) by purposefully stopping Christopher on account of his race,
Nestlerode and Kerr deprived Christopher of the equal protection of the law in violation
of his Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) through his deliberate indifference as to
supervision, training, and ratification of Nestlerode and Kerr’s actions, Hose caused the
violations of Christopher’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (4) the County,
through Hose’s action and inaction, was liable for the violations of Christopher’s Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–43, Christopher v.
Nestlerode, No. 04-0977 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2005).  Following discovery, the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Hose and the County,
but denied all other summary judgment motions.  Noting that § 1983 liability can only be
8imposed on a person acting under color of state law who directly participates in or
causally facilitates the violation of an individual’s federally secured rights, Christopher v.
Nestlerode, 373 F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 (M.D. Pa. 2005), the court found Hose’s conduct
had not met the standard for liability through deliberate indifference, see id. at 523
(“Neither Hose nor the County of York had any reason to suspect that an incident of this
type would arise or that additional training was necessary.”).  A jury trial followed on the
claims against Nestlerode and Kerr.
In instructing the jury on “probable cause” under the Fourth Amendment, the
District Court stated: “The relevant question for these purposes is whether based on the
facts then known to the officer an objective, reasonable person could conclude that the
plaintiff had committed any criminal offense.”  (J.A. 1235.)  It added that the specific
criminal offenses the jury should consider were violations of §§ 3361 (unsafe speed) and
3362 (exceeding the speed limit), even though (1) Nestlerode testified he had not had
“probable cause” to stop Christopher for violating § 3362 and (2) Christopher had not
been cited for violating § 3362.  The court specified that the Motor Vehicle Code’s speed
timing requirements (which are viewed as relevant to “probable cause” by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court) “are not relevant to the issue of whether probable cause
existed to believe that the plaintiff had committed a violation of either Section 3361 or
Section 3362 . . . .  You must not consider these requirements in considering whether
probable cause existed.”  (J.A. 1237–38.)
9On the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, the District Court instructed
the jury that discriminatory intent may be inferred based on evidence that the defendant
did not believe or could not reasonably have believed that his act served a legitimate
purpose.  It added:
In other words, you may consider the defendant’s subjective beliefs as to
the grounds for the stop, including the defendant’s understandings of the
requirements of Pennsylvania law that an officer must follow a vehicle for
3/10 of a mile and must use a calibrated speedometer in order to obtain a
valid estimate of speed in deciding whether the defendant reasonably
believed that the act served a legitimate purpose and whether the defendant
acted with discriminatory intent.
(J.A. 1243.)  The court specified: “you may find that an act has a discriminatory purpose
even if you find that it served another legitimate purpose.”  (J.A. 1242–43.)
The jury returned a verdict for Nestlerode and Kerr, finding Christopher had failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all the elements either of an unreasonable
seizure claim or of an equal protection claim.  Christopher appealed both the jury verdict
and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Hose and the County.  The York
Defendants cross-appealed “from any and all Memorandum Decisions and Orders, or
other final orders denying Defendants’ Motions.”  Notice of Cross-Appeal, Nestlerode,
No. 04-0977 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2005).
III.
A.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Christopher’s § 1983 action under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction over Christopher’s appeal under
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28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Ordinarily, only a party “aggrieved” by a judgment or order of a
district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom, and a party that
receives all that it has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the
relief.  Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980).  See also
IPSCO Steel, Inc. v. Blaine Constr. Corp., 371 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2004).  When a
prevailing party seeks to appeal an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment in its favor, it
may not do so if the collateral ruling was not necessary to the judgment.  Partmar Corp.
v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 100 n.6 (1954).  The York
Defendants prevailed on the merits and seek to cross-appeal from collateral rulings
adverse to them but unnecessary to support the judgments in their favor.  We hold they
lack standing to bring their cross-appeal, and do not consider it.
Where, as here, a party properly objects to a jury instruction, we exercise plenary
review to determine whether the instruction misstated the applicable law.  Franklin
Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2005).  We must
consider “whether the charge, taken as a whole, properly apprised the jury of the issues
and the applicable law.”  Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir.
1998).  We review the phrasing of jury instructions for abuse of discretion to determine
whether they were misleading.  Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 929 (3d Cir.
1997).   Harmless errors in a jury instruction that do not prejudice the complaining party
are not sufficient grounds on which to vacate a judgment and order a new trial, Watson v.
S.E. Penn. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2000), but error in a jury
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instruction will be harmless only if it is “highly probable” that it did not affect the verdict,
Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2006).  See also
Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding inapplicable jury instruction on
deliberate indifference in § 1983 action was capable of misleading jury into improperly
considering law enforcement officer’s subjective intentions, and was thus not harmless
error).
We exercise plenary review over the grant or denial of summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.  Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2005).
B.
Section 1983 creates liability for anyone who, under color of state law, “subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  Here, Christopher contends the
York Defendants deprived him of his right to be secure against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend IV.
“[A] traffic stop will be deemed a reasonable ‘seizure’ when an objective review
of the facts shows that an officer possessed specific, articulable facts that an individual
was violating a traffic law at the time of the stop.”  United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464
     3 In Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 397, we reaffirmed our understanding that “probable
cause” is not required for a traffic stop to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
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F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–09
(1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).3  A law enforcement officer’s subjective
intentions “play no role in ordinary . . . Fourth Amendment analysis.”  Whren, 517 U.S. at
813.  Rather, demanding “objective specificity,” we have stated that “[t]he ultimate
question is whether a reasonable, trained officer standing in [the seizing officer’s] shoes
could articulate specific reasons justifying [the seized individual’s] detention.”  Johnson
v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1996).
This Court recently rejected the argument that an arrest made in violation of state
law is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but advocated a totality of the
circumstances approach:
[T]he validity of an arrest under state law must never be confused or conflated
with the Fourth Amendment concept of reasonableness[;] the validity of an arrest
under state law is at most a factor that a court may consider in assessing the
broader question of probable cause.
United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Supreme Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances inquiry includes the officer’s
“own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).  The
District Court’s Fourth Amendment instruction was both legally erroneous and
misleading, because it instructed the jury that the state law speed timing requirements,
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rather than being a possible factor in a totality of the circumstances Fourth Amendment
analysis, were simply “not relevant” to “probable cause,” and that the jury “must not
consider” those requirements and Nestlerode’s knowledge of them.  (J.A. 1237–38.)
Nestlerode testified about his extensive knowledge of the Motor Vehicle Code, as
well as his awareness of case law governing traffic stops.  It has been the law in
Pennsylvania since 1995 that without a speed timing device an officer cannot have
“probable cause” to stop a motorist for driving at an unsafe speed in violation of § 3361
based on an estimate of the vehicle’s speed alone.  See Whitmyer, 668 A.2d at 117–18. 
And Nestlerode testified that, because he had not used a speed timing device, he had
lacked “probable cause” to stop Christopher for violating § 3362, as well.  But he also
testified as to his ability to calculate vehicle speed instantaneously: “I’m very familiar
with timing devices, and I have used stopwatches standing out on the highway and
throughout all my years experience I have come to be able to estimate speed I would say
very efficiently . . . .”  (J.A. 671.)  After hearing Nestlerode’s testimony on his ability to
estimate speeds instantaneously, the jury was instructed that it must not consider the
speed timing device requirements (which Nestlerode had not complied with) in
determining whether Nestlerode and Kerr had “probable cause” to stop Christopher.
The objective Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry requires examining the
totality of the circumstances, Laville, 480 F.3d at 189, that is, whether a law enforcement
officer with Nestlerode’s experience could have held an objectively reasonable belief that
Christopher was violating §§ 3361 or 3362.  We believe the jury should have been
     4 We recognize that, until our holding in Laville, the standard in this Circuit was
unsettled.  The able District Judge’s scholarly summary judgment opinion cogently and
comprehensively discussed case law and scholarship on this question.
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instructed that it could choose to consider, as part of this inquiry, the requirements for
“probable cause” under Pennsylvania law to stop a motorist for violating those provisions
as one of the factors in its totality of the circumstances analysis.  Because the District
Court instructed the jury that these requirements must not be considered, that instruction
was both legally erroneous and misleading.
After having heard Nestlerode’s speed estimate and his basis for it, the jury was
instructed to ignore the state law requirements with which it was inconsistent.  This error
was not harmless, because it is not “highly probable” that the instruction to ignore
Pennsylvania speed timing requirements did not affect the jury’s finding on “probable
cause.”  See, e.g., Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding instruction
that allowed jury to return verdict against § 1983 plaintiffs where warrantless home
entries by police could be justified by exigent circumstances even in the absence of
probable cause was not harmless error, even though jury’s verdict against plaintiffs might
actually have been based on probable cause).  Accordingly, the instruction constituted
reversible error.4
C.
1.
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Christopher contends he is entitled to a new trial on his equal protection claim. 
Because both parties linked the presence or absence of “probable cause” to whether
Nestlerode and Kerr stopped him on account of his race, Christopher contends the court’s
“probable cause” jury instruction tainted his equal protection claim.
The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race.”  Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.  As we explained in Carrasca v.
Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 836 (3d Cir. 2002), “[t]he fact that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation does not mean that one was not discriminatorily selected for
enforcement of a law. . . .  [E]qual protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
require a wholly separate analysis from . . . claims under the Fourth Amendment”
(internal citations omitted).  Whereas a law enforcement officer’s subjective intentions
have no place in Fourth Amendment analysis, they are relevant to equal protection
analysis.  Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law and Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427,
440–41 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, the District Court’s equal protection instruction correctly
stated: (1) the equal protection inquiry is distinct from the “probable cause” inquiry, and
the presence of “probable cause” does not mean an officer acted without discriminatory
intent; (2) the equal protection inquiry considers both subjective and objective intent; and
(3) the jury could consider state law speed timing requirements in determining whether
Nestlerode and Kerr acted with discriminatory intent.
Jury instructions do not constitute reversible error so long as, “taken as a whole
and viewed in the light of the evidence, [the instructions] fairly and adequately submit the
     5 Christopher cites our decision in Parks v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327, 1336 (3d
Cir. 1997), for the proposition that “‘instructions that contain some characterizations of
the law that are accurate may nonetheless become unacceptably tainted by the presence of
other, misleading comments.’” Christopher Reply Br. 30.  Parks, however, concerned a
single instruction that was internally inconsistent.
     6 Christopher contends Hose and the County were liable for failure to promulgate
policies, failure to train, and failure to monitor or supervise.  We apply the same
“deliberate indifference” standard to all three arguments.  See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh,
89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting “courts have adopted the ‘deliberate indifference’
standard in other policy and custom contexts”).
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issues in the case to the [jurors without confusing or misleading them].”  United States v.
Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1243 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993).  The equal protection instruction here was
fair, adequate, and correct.  Nor was Christopher’s equal protection claim tainted by the
District Court’s Fourth Amendment instruction.5
2.
Christopher contends the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Hose and the County was improper.  A plaintiff claiming municipal § 1983 liability for a
constitutional violation through failure to train6 is held to the exacting requirement of
showing “deliberate indifference” on the part of a municipal policymaker, such that the
policymaker is effectively the moving force behind the violation.  City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).  “That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily
trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the [municipality], for the officer’s
shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.”  Id. at
390–91.  There was no pattern of racial profiling by the deputies under Hose’s command. 
17
See Nestlerode, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 523.  A single constitutional violation can still provide
the basis for municipal liability for failure to train, Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 407–09 (1997), but only where “the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights”
that the policymaker’s inaction amounts to deliberate indifference.  Canton, 489 U.S. at
391.  We do not believe there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the deliberate
indifference standard was met here.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that, in order to show the
need for more or different training was so obvious, “the plaintiff must show that the
situation . . . presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or
supervision will make less difficult.”  Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d
Cir. 1992).  Where a law enforcement officer’s duty is clear (e.g., not to commit perjury
when testifying at the trial of a criminal defendant whom the officer knows to be
innocent), no such difficult choice is presented, and the need for more or different training
is not so obvious.  Id. at 299–300.  As to the inadequacy of training being so likely to
result in a constitutional violation, “the identified deficiency in the training program must
be closely related to the ultimate injury.”  Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
Nestlerode testified as to his “understanding [that] you should never base any
traffic stop . . . on someone’s race or ethnic group.  Abolutely never.”  (J.A. 628–29.) 
The term “racial profiling” appears nowhere in the Deputies’ training materials, and no
specific Sheriff’s Department policy cautioned deputies not to make traffic stops on the
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basis of race.  But among the training materials Nestlerode and Kerr did receive were
instructions to: “Above all else, respect the Constitutional Rights of all men and women
to Liberty, Equality, and Justice” (J.A. 1981); “never permit . . . prejudices . . . to
influence . . . decisions” (JA. 1981); make traffic stops only when there is proper cause to
believe a violation has been committed (J.A. 3037); and “treat everyone with dignity and
respect” (J.A. 3037).  We conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact such that a
reasonable jury could have found both that (1) deputy sheriffs in York County were faced
with a “difficult choice” as to whether to engage in racial profiling that any additional
training would have made easier and (2) the training deputy sheriffs received was so
inadequate as to render an incident of racial profiling likely.  The District Court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Hose and the County.
IV.
We will affirm the final judgment in favor of Hose and the County.  We will affirm
in part and vacate in part the final judgment in favor of Nestlerode and Kerr, and will
remand for a new trial on Christopher’s Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of error in
the District Court’s jury instruction.  We do not reach the York Defendants’ cross-appeal
and will dismiss it.
Barry, Circuit Judge, dissenting from § III(B)  
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Deputy Sheriff Nestlerode testified without contradiction that based on his decades
of experience in enforcing the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, Christopher was
driving at least twice the posted speed limit on a wet city street.  Exceeding the speed
limit could well be a violation of § 3361 or § 3362 of the Motor Vehicle Code if
Nestlerode had measured Christopher’s speed in accordance with § 3368, which he had
not.  
But the issue before us is not whether Nestlerode’s stop of Christopher was valid
under state law or whether Christopher could have been convicted for a violation of state
law, as the Opinion of the majority would lead us to believe.  Rather, the issue before us
is whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it was reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances for this highly experienced Deputy Sheriff to stop a driver he knew was
going at least twice the speed limit.  As to a Fourth Amendment analysis, the validity of a
stop or an arrest under state law is “at most” a factor – a possible factor only – in
assessing the broader question of probable cause.  United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187,
192 (3d Cir. 2007).  The majority treats it as virtually dispositive.  
To be sure, the District Court erred in instructing the jury that the state speed
timing requirements were “not relevant.”  But whatever marginal relevance those
requirements may have had for Fourth Amendment purposes, it is clear, at least to me,
that it is not “highly probable” that the faulty jury instruction influenced the jury’s
verdict.  I respectfully dissent from § III(B) of the Opinion.  
